Supreme Court of India
Arjun Singh vs Mohindra Kumar & Ors on 13 December, 1963
It is needless to point out that interlocutory orders are of various kinds; some like orders of stay, injunction or receiver are designed to preserve the status quo pending the litigation and to ensure that the parties might not be prejudiced by the normal delay which the proceedings before the court usually take. They do not, in that sense, decide in any manner the merits of the controversy in issue in the suit and do not, of course, put an end to it even in part. Such orders are certainly capable of being altered or varied by subsequent applications for the same relief, though normally only on proof of new facts or new situations which subsequently emerge. As they do not impinge upon the legal rights of parties to the litigation the principle of res judicata does not apply to the findings on which these orders are based, though if applications were made for relief on the same basis after the same has once been dis- posed of the court would be justified in rejecting the same as an abuse of the process, of court. There are other orders which are also interlocutory, but would fall into a different category. The difference from the ones just now referred to lies in the fact that they are not directed to maintaining the status quo or to preserve the property pending the final adjudication, but are designed to ensure the just, smooth, orderly and expeditious disposal of the suit. They are interlocutory in the sense that they do not decide any matter in issue arising in the suit, nor put an end to the litigation. The case of an application under O. IX. r. 7 would be an illustration of this type. If an application made under the provisions of that rule is dismissed and an appeal were filed against the decree in the suit in which such application were made, there can be no doubt that the propriety of the order rejecting the reopening of the proceeding and the refusal to relegate the party to an earlier stage might be canvassed in the appeal and dealt with by the appellate court. In that sense, the refusal of the court to permit the defendant to "set the clock back" does not attain finality. But what we are concerned with is slightly different and that is whether the same Court is finally bound by that order at later stages, so as to preclude its being reconsidered. Even if the rule of resjudicata does not apply it would not follow that on every subsequent day on which the suit stands adjourned for further hearing the petition could be repeated and fresh orders sought on the basis of identical facts. The principle that repeated applications based on the same facts and seeking the same reliefs might be disallowed by the court does not however necessarily rest on the principle of resjudicata. Thus if an application for the adjournment of a suit is rejected, a subsequent application for the same purpose even if based on the same facts, is not barred on the application 'of any rule of res judicata, but would be rejected for the same grounds on which the original application was refused. The principle underlying the distinction between the rule of res judicata and a rejection on the ground that no new facts have been adduced to justify a different order is vital. If the principle of resjudicata is applicable to the decision on a particular issue of fact, even if fresh facts were placed before the Court, the bar would continue to operate and preclude a fresh investigation of the issue, whereas in the other case, on proof of fresh facts, the court would be competent, nay,, would be bound to take those into account and make an order conformably to the facts freshly brought before the court.
In the case of Sunil Kumar and Anr. v. Ram
Parkash and Ors., AIR 1988 SC 576 the Hon'ble Apex Court
has observed that karta is the best person as to how the joint
family estate could be beneficially put into use to subserve the
interests of the family. A coparcener cannot interfere in these
acts of management. Apart from that a father karta in addition to
the aforesaid powers of alienation has also the special power to
sell or mortgage ancestral property to discharge his antecedent
debt which is not tainted with immorality. If there is no such need
or benefit, the purchaser takes risk and the right and interest of
coparcener will remain unimpaired in the alienated property.
Therefore, he cannot move the Court to grant relief by injunction
restraining the karta from alienating the coparcenary property.
The coparcener has adequate remedy to impeach the alienation
made by the karta.
The application for breach of injunction should be
separately registered as Misc. Judicial case and should be tried
by framing appropriate points. The proceeding under Order 39,
Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code are absolutely independent
proceedings. ( Rampyaribai Sukhdeo Daga and ...Vrs..
Niladevi Naryandas, reported in 2007(4) Mh. L.J. 213)
After perusal of Order 39 and rule thereunder, no
where it is specifically stated that, while granting temporary
injunction, court may impose some conditions. However, the
court may impose terms in exercise of its discretionary
jurisdiction. Injunctive relief is of discretionary nature and the
court passing an order for a temporary injunction, could regulate
its exercise of discretion by imposing terms for protecting
egitimate right of the parties. Court can take undertaking from
either party or take security to comply the undertaking. While
exercising discretionary power, the court should also adopt the
procedure of calling upon the plaintiff to file a bond to the
satisfaction of the court that in the event of his failing in the suit
to obtain the relief asked for in the plaint, he would adequately
compensate the defendant for the loss ensued due to the Order
of injunction granted in favour of plaintiff. Court can impose
suitable conditions while granting ad-interim injunctions (Vascon
Engineers Ltd. v/s Sansara Hotels Indra Pvt. Ltd 2009 (4)
Mh.L.J. 859)
When court grant ad-interim injunction it should be
finally decided within thirty days. However, if that application is
not decided within thirty days then also order of ad-interim
injunction remain in force. However court should passed order in
writing as to cause of delay failing which it becomes appealable.
Then appellate court can change that order with further direction
to take appropriate action against that presiding judge of trial
court (Venkatsubbiah Naidu v/s S. Chellappan and ors AIR
2000 SC 3032).
In case of M/S Kachhi Properties ..VS.. All
Residents 2010 (5) Bom. C. R. 43, it has been observed as
follows:
(a) Section 52 of the TP Act provides adequate protection to
the parties from transfers pendente lite and such
transferees are neither required to be impleaded nor can
claim impleadment. They cannot even resist execution
proceedings.
(b) plaintiff's could (or rather ought to) have notices of their
suits registered under section 18 of the Indian Registration
Act, They cannot seek to restrain adversary by an
injunction by refusing to go in for registration of the lis.
(c) There is power of court to issue injunction but it must be
exercises such power if protection provided by Section 52
of the TP Act is shown to be inadequate.
(d) In the face of protection provided by Section 52 of the TP
Act, Courts should be cautious in examining the claims by
plaintiff's of irreparable loss injunction to restrain
alienations is refused.
(e) Courts should consider who would face greater
inconvenience
(f) Courts may impose suitable conditions (like seeking
undertaking that no equities would be claimed, on account
of sale/development of properties effecting sale only after
putting transferee's to notice that their rights would be
subject to suit etc., Interests of prospective purchasers
would also be protected if plaintiff's in such cases register
the lis, though may be optional.)
Supreme Court of India
Sushil Kumar & Anr vs Ram Prakash & Ors on 13 January, 1988
The legal position of karta or manager has been succinctly summarised in the Mayne's Hindu Law (12th Ed. para 318) thus: 318. Manager's Legal position-"The position of a karta or manager is sui generis; the relation between him and the other members of the family is not that of principal and agent, or of partners. It is more like that of a trustee and cestui que trust. But the fiduciary relationship does not involve all the duties which are imposed upon trustees."
. It is true that a coparcener takes by birth an interest in the ancestral property, but he is not entitled to separate possession of the coparcenary estate. His rights are not independent of the control of the karta. It would be for the karta to consider the actual pressure on the joint family estate. It would be for him to foresee the danger to be averted. And it would be for him to examine as to how best the joint family estate could be beneficially put into use to subserve the interests of the family. A coparcener cannot interfere in these acts of management. Apart from that, a father-karta in addition to the aforesaid powers of alienation has also the special power to sell or mortgage ancestral property to discharge his antecedent debt which is not tainted with immorality. If there is no such need or benefit, the purchaser takes risk and the right and interest of coparcener will remain unimpaired in the alienated property. No doubt the law confers a right on the coparcener to challenge the alienation made by karta, but that right is not inclusive Of the right to obstruct alienation. Nor the right to obstruct alienation could be considered as incidental to the right to challenge the alienation. These are two distinct rights. One is the right to claim a share in the joint family estate free from unnecessary and unwanted encumbrance. The other is a right to interfere with the act of management of the joint family affairs. The coparcener cannot claim the latter right and indeed, he is not entitled for it. Therefore, he cannot move the court to grant relief by injunction restraining the karta from alienating the coparcenary property.
"If it is held that such a suit would be competent the result would be that each time the manager or the karta wants to sell property, the coparcener would file a suit which may take number of years for its disposal. The legal necessity or the purpose of the proposed sale which may be of pressing and urgent nature, would in most cases be frustrated by the time the suit is disposed of. Legally speaking unless the alienation in fact is completed there would be no cause of action for any coparcener to maintain a suit because the right is only to challenge the alienation made and there is no right recognised in law to maintain a suit to prevent the proposed sale. The principle that an injunction can be granted for preventing waste by a manager or karta obviously would not be applicable to such a suit because the proposed alienation for an alleged need or the benefit of the estate cannot be said to be an act of waste by any stretch of reasoning. We are, therefore, of the considered view that a coparcener has no right to maintain a suit for permanent injunction restraining the manager or the karta from alienating the coparcenary property and his right is only to challenge the same and to recover the property after it has come into being."
In Anathula Sudhakar V/s P. Buchi Reddy reported in 2008(4) SCC 594 held that :-
1)Where a plaintiff is in lawful or peaceful possession of a
property and such possession is interfered or threatened by
the defendant, suit for an injunction simplicitor will lie. A
person has a right to protect his possession against any
person who does not prove a better title by seeking a
prohibitory injunction. But a person in wrongful possession is
not entitled to an injunction against the rightful owner.
2) Where the title of the plaintiff is not disputed, but he
is not in possession, his remedy is to file a suit for possession
and seek in addition if necessary an injunction. A person out
of possession, cannot seek the relief of injunction simplicitor,
without claiming the relief of possession.
3) Where the plaintiff is in possession, but his title to the
property is in dispute, or under a cloud, or where the
defendant asserts title thereto and there is also a threat of
dispossession from defendant, the plaintiff will have to sue for
declaration of title and the consequential relief of injunction or
not able to establish possession, necessarily the plaintiff will
have to file a suit for declaration, possession and injunction.
In an action for recovery of possession of
immovable property, or for protecting possession thereof,
upon the legal title to the property being established, the
possession or occupation of the property by a person other
than the holder of the legal title will be presumed to have
been under and in subordination to the legal title, and it will
be for the person resisting a claim for recovery of
possession or claiming a right to continue in possession, to
establish that he has such a right. To put it differently,
wherever pleadings, and documents established title to a
particular property and possession is in question, it will be
for the person in possession to give sufficiently detailed
pleading, particulars and documents to support his claim in
order to continue in possession.
in cases relating to orders for demolition of buildings,
irreparable loss may occur if the structure is demolished even
before trial, and an opportunity to establish by evidence that the
structure was authorized and not illegal. In such cases, where
prima facie case is made out, the balance of convenience
automatically tilts in favour of the plaintiff and a temporary
injunction will be issued to preserve status quo.(Seema Arshad
Zaheer and others Vs Municipal Corporation of Greater
Mumbai and others, (2006) 5 SCC 282)
ENFORCEMENT OF NEGATIVE COVENANT:
Supreme Court of India
Percept D'Markr (India) Pvt. Ltd vs Zaheer Khan & Anr on 22 March, 2006
It was further submitted that assuming without admitting that the negative covenant in Clause 31(b) is not void and is enforceable, it was nevertheless inappropriate, if not impermissible, for the Single Judge to grant an injunction to enforce it at the interim stage, for the following reasons:-
"(i) Firstly, grant of this injunction resulted in compelling specific performance of a contract of personal, confidential and fiduciary service, which is barred by Clauses (b) and (d) of Section 14(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963;
(ii) Secondly, it is not only barred by Clause (a) of Section 14(1) of the Specific Relief Act, but this Court has consistently held that there shall be no specific performance of contracts for personal services;
(iii) Thirdly, this amounted to granting the whole or entire relief which may be claimed at the conclusion of trial, which is impermissible;
(iv) Fourthly, the Single Judge's order completely overlooked the principles of balance of convenience and irreparable injury. Whereas Percept could be fully compensated in monetary terms if they finally succeeded at trial, respondent No.1 could never be compensated for being forced to enter into a contract with a party he did not desire to deal with, if the trial results in rejection of Percept's claim.
Supreme Court of India
Bank Of Maharashtra vs Rice Shipping & Transport Co. Pvt. ... on 16 February, 1995
By the interim order the High Court has directed the appellant-bank to credit a sum of Rs. 95,000/- in the current account No. 318 of respondent No. 1. The High Court has recorded that respondent through their counsel had given an undertaking to bring back the amount if the Court so de- sires. The said interim order, in substance, grants the relief which the respondent would have been given at the final stage in the event of their writ petition being allowed by the High Court.
12. Time and again this Court has deprecated the practice of granting interim orders which practically give the principal relief sought in the petition for no better reason than that a prima facie case has been made out, without being concerned about the balance of convenience, the public interest and a host of other considerations, [See : Assistant Collector of Central Excise, West Bengal v. Dunlop India Ltd & Ors., 1985 (1) SCC 260 at p. 265; State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. M/s Swaika Properties & Anr., 1985 (3) SCC 217 at p. 224].
13. In the instant case since there is serious dispute on facts it cannot even be said that a prima facie case had been made out for grant of an interim order in favour of the respondents which enables them to have the reimbursement of the sum of Rs. 95,000/- that was debited to their account in view of the encashment of the cheque in question. We are of the view that this was not a case in which the High Court while admitting the Writ Petition should have passed an interim order giving such a direction. In the circumstances we are unable to uphold the said interim order.
INJUCTION IN TRADEMARK MATTERS:
Supreme Court of India
Suresh Dhanuka vs Sunita Mohapatra on 2 December, 2011
(iv) Whether the invocation of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, to enforce the negative covenant contained in the Deed of Assignment, was contrary to the provisions of Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and was, therefore, void?
It is obvious that what is declared to be void by virtue of Section 27 is any Agreement to restrain any person from exercising his right to carry on a profession or trade or business and any restraint thereupon by an Agreement would be void.
34. As will be seen from the materials on record, the Appellant did not ask for any injunction against the Respondent from carrying on any trade or business, but he objected to the use by the Respondent of the Trade Mark, in which he had acquired a 50% interest, while selling her products.
The learned Single Judge of the High Court, while referring to some of the provisions of the Agreement between the parties, apparently overlooked the provisions relating to the use of the Trade Mark contained in the Deed of Assignment. Although, reference was made to Clause 19 of the Agreement, the High Court failed to notice that the same was not contained in the Deed of Assignment, whereby 50% of the right, title and interest of the Respondent in the Trade Mark "Naturoma Herbal" was assigned in favour of the Appellant absolutely and forever. As has been emphasized hereinbefore, even upon termination of the joint venture under the Agreement between the parties, neither the Appellant nor the Respondent would be entitled to use or register the Mark in their own names or jointly with some other party. In fact, the relevant terms and conditions of the Deed of Assignment had been extracted by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment, but the same appear to have been lost sight of while considering the terms and conditions of the Agreement executed between the parties.
38. In our view, this is not a case where money can be an adequate compensation, since the Appellant has apparently acquired a 50% interest in the Trade Mark in question, together with the goodwill of the business in relation to the products in which the Trade Mark is used.
39. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court erred in reversing the order passed by the District Judge in ARBP No.576 of 2007 filed by the Appellant, under which the status-quo would have been maintained till the dispute was settled in arbitration.
Supreme Court of India
Food Corporation Of India vs Sukh Prasad on 24 March, 2009
24. The power exercised by a court under order 39, Rule 2A of the Code is punitive in nature, akin to the power to punish for civil contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The person who complains of disobedience or breach has to clearly make out beyond any doubt that there was an injunction or order directing the person against whom the application is made, to do or desist from doing some specific thing or act and that there was disobedience or breach of such order. While considering an application under order 39 Rule 2A, the court cannot construe the order in regard to which disobedience/breach is alleged, as creating an obligation to do something which is not mentioned in the `order', on surmises suspicions and inferences. The power under Rule 2A should be exercised with great caution and responsibility. It is shocking that the trial court had entertained an application under Order 39 Rule 2A from a person who was not entitled to file the application, has accepted an interpretation of the order which does not flow from the order, and has created an liability where none existed, resulting in attachments of the assets of FCI to an extent of more than Rs.1.12 crores. The order dated 15.12.2004 cannot be supported or sustained under any circumstances.
Supreme Court of India
Samee Khan vs Bindu Khan on 1 September, 1998
But the position under rule 2A of Order 39 is different. Even if the injunction order was subsequently set aside the disobedience does not get erased. It may be a different matter that the rigour of such disobedience may be toned down if he order is subsequently set aside. for what purpose the property is to be attached in the case of disobedience of the order of injunction? Sub-rule (2) provides that if the disobedience or breach continues beyond one year from the date of attachment the court is empowered to sell the property under attachment and compensate the affected party from such sale proceeds. In other words, attachment will continue only till the breach continues or the disobedience persists subject to a limit of one year period. If the disobedience ceases to continue in the meanwhile the attachment also would cease. Thus even under Order 39 Rule 2A the attachment is a mode to compel the opposite party to obey the order of injunction. But detaining the disobedient party in civil prison is a mode of punishment for his being guilty of such disobedience.
The words "and may also" appearing in R.2A were sought to be given a meaning that the course suggested thereafter in the Rule has to be resorted to as an optional additional step, a resort to which would be impermissible without complying with the first course suggested in the Rule. The word "also" has different attributes and its meaning is not to be confined to "further more". In legalistic use, the word "also" can be employed to denote other meninges as well. In Black's Law Dictionary the word "also has the following variety of meanings:
Also. Besides as well in addition; likewise, in like manner; similarly; too; withal. Some other thing, including, further, furthermore, in the same manner, moreover; nearly the same as the word "and" or "likewise".
Since the word "also" can have meaning as such "as well" or "likewise", can not those meaning be used for understanding the scope of the trio words "and may also"? Those words cannot altogether be detached from the other words in the sub-rule. Here again the word "and" need not necessarily be understood as denoting a conjunctive sense. In Stroud's judicial Dictionary it is stated that the word "and" has generally a cumulative sense, but sometimes it is by force of a context read as "or" Maxwell on "interpretation of Statutes" has recognised the above use to carry out the interpretation of the legislature. This has been approved by this Court in Ishwar Singh vs. State of UP {AIR 1968 SC 1450}. The principle of Noscitur A Sociis can be profitably be used to construct the word "and may also" in the sub-rule.
Hence the words "and may also" in Rule 2-A cannot be interpreted the context as denoting to a step which is permissible only as additional to attachment of property of the opposite party. If those words are interpreted like that it may lead to an anomalous situation. If the person who defies the injunction order has no property at all the court becomes totally powerless to deal with such a disobedient party. he would be immuned from all consequences even for any open defiance of a court order. No interpretation hall be allowed to bring about such a sterile or anomalous situation (vide Constitution Bench in Vidya Charan Shukla vs. Khubchand Baghel [AIR 1964 SC 1099]. The pragmatic interpretation, therefore, must be this: It is open to the court to attach the property of the disobeying party and at the same time the court can order him to be detained in civil prison also if the court deems it necessary, Similarly the court which orders the person to be detained in civil prison can also attach the property of that person. Both steps can be resorted to or one of them alone need be chosen. It is left to the court to decide on consideration of the fact situation in each case.
Supreme Court of India
Vareed Jacob vs Sosamma Geevarghese & Ors on 21 April, 2004
The Parliament consciously used two different expressions 'incidental proceedings' and 'supplemental proceedings' which obviously would carry two different meanings.
The expression 'ancillary' means aiding, auxiliary; subordinate; attendant upon; that which aids or promotes a proceeding regarded as the principal.
The expression 'supplementary proceeding' on the other hand, would mean a separate proceeding in an original action, in which the court where the action is pending is called upon to exercise its jurisdiction in the interest of justice.
The expression 'incidental' may mean differently in different contexts. While dealing with a procedural law, it may mean proceedings which are procedural in nature but when it is used in relation to an agreement or the delegated legislation, it may mean something more; but the distinction between an incidental proceeding and a supplemental proceeding being obvious cannot be ignored.
Indisputably, the effect of an order passed under different provisions of Section 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be different. They have been so legislated keeping in view different exigencies of circumstances but it must not be forgotten that the power thereunder is to be exercised in the interest of justice. The statutory scheme therefor is that supplemental proceeding should be taken recourse to only when the interest of justice is required to be sub-served, although the interlocutory order may not have anything to do with the ultimate decision of the court.
The consequences of an order of attachment before judgment as also, an order of injunction can be grave. By reason of such an order, a right of a party to the lis may be affected or remained under animated suspension. By reason of an interlocutory order whether in terms of Order 38, Order 39 or Order 40, a person's right to transfer a property may remain suspended as a result whereof he may suffer grave injury. When the suit is dismissed for default, he may exercise his right. If it is to be held that on restoration of the suit the order of attachment before judgment or an order, an injunction is automatically revived, as a result whereof the status of the parties would be in the same position as on the date of passing of the initial interlocutory order, they may be proceeded with for violation of the order of injunction or an order of attachment before judgment. The right of subsequent purchaser may also be affected. By reason of taking recourse to a supplemental proceedings, the rights of the parties and in some cases the right of even a third party cannot be allowed to be taken away.
From the decisions rendered by different High Courts, therefore, the law that emerges is that there exists a distinction between ancillary orders which are required to be passed by the court in aid of or supplemental to the ultimate decision of the Court; as contradistinguished to an order passed under Part VI of the Code of Civil Procedure in terms whereof an order is passed in favour of a party to the lis which may not have a bearing on the ultimate result of the suit. An interlocutory order passed in a suit may not also have anything to do with the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. An order for injunction or appointment of receiver can be passed even at the instance of the defendant. An order which has been obtained by the defendant may not revive on restoration of the suit. Supplementary proceedings, thus, envisage that such a power must be specially conferred upon the Court which are required to be passed in the interest of justice irrespective of the fact as to whether the same would ultimately have any bearing with the reliefs claimed in the suit or not. In absence of any statutory provisions such a power cannot be exercised whereas a power which is ancillary or incidental, can always be exercised by the Court in aid of and supplemental to the final order that may be passed. Furthermore, a jurisdiction expressly conferred by a statute and an inherent power, subject to just exceptions, must be treated differently.
I am, therefore, of the opinion that the interim order of injunction did not revive on restoration of the suit. The Courts, however, would be well-advised keeping in view the controversy to specifically pass an order when the suit is dismissed for default stating when interlocutory orders are vacated and on restoration of the suit, if the court intends to revive such interlocutory orders, an express order to that effect should be passed.
Supreme Court of India
Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla & ... vs Hind Rubber Industries Private ... on 19 February, 1997
According to this section if an objection is raised to the jurisdiction of the court at the hearing of an application for grant of, or for vacating, interim relief, the court should determine that issue in the first instance as a preliminary issue before granted or setting aside the relief already granted. An application raising objection to the jurisdiction to the court is directed to be heard with all expedition. Sub-rule (2), however, says that the command in sub-rule (1) does not preclude the court from granting such interim relief as it may consider necessary pending the decision on the question of jurisdiction. In our opinion, the provision merely states the obvious. It makes explicit what is implicit in law. Just because an objection to the jurisdiction is raised, the court does not become helpless forthwith - nor does it become incompetent to grant the interim relief. It can. At the same time, it should also decide the objection to jurisdiction at the earlier possible moment. This is the general principle and this is what Section 9-A reiterates. Takes this very case. The plaintiff asked for temporary injunction. An ad-interim injunction was granted. Then the defendants came forward objecting to the grant of injunction and also raising an objection to the jurisdiction of the court. The court over-ruled the objection as to jurisdiction and made the interim injunction absolute. The defendants filed an appeal against the decision on the question of jurisdiction. While that appeal was pending, several other interim orders were passed both by the Civil Court as well as by the High Court. Ultimately, no doubt, High Court has found that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction of entertain the suit but all this took about six years. Can it be said that orders passed by the Civil Court and the High court during this period of six years were all non-est and that it is open to the defendants to flout them merrily, without fear of any consequence. Admittedly, this could not be done until the High Court's decision on the question of jurisdiction. The question is whether the said decision of the High Court means that no person can be punished for flouting or disobeying the interim/interlocutory orders while they were in force, i.e., for violations and disobedience committed prior to the decision of the High Court on the question of jurisdiction. Holding that by virtue of the said decision of the High Court [on the question of jurisdiction], no one can be punished thereafter for disobedience or violation of the interim orders committed prior to the said decision of the High Court, would indeed be subversive of rule of law and would seriously erode the dignity and the authority of the courts. We must repeat that this is not even a case where a suit was filed in wrong court knowingly or only with a view to snatch an interim order. As pointed out hereinabove, the suit was filed in the Civil Court bonafide. We are of the opinion that in such a case the defendants cannot escape the consequences of their disobedience and violation of the interim injunction committed by them prior to the High Court's decision on the question of jurisdiction.
where an objection to jurisdiction of a civil court is raised to entertain a suit and to pass any interim orders therein, the Court should decide the question of jurisdiction in the first instance but that does not mean that pending the decision on the question of jurisdiction, the Court has no jurisdiction to pass interim orders as may be called for in the facts and circumstances of the case. A mere objection to jurisdiction does not instantly disable the court from passing any interim orders. It can yet pass appropriate orders. At the same time, it should also decide the question of jurisdiction at the earliest possible time. the interim orders so passed are orders within jurisdiction when passed and effective till the court decides that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. These interim orders undoubtedly come to an end with the decision that this Court had no jurisdiction. It is open to the court to modify these orders while holding that it has no jurisdiction to try the suit. Indeed, in certain situation, it would be its duty to modify such orders or make appropriate directions. For example, take a case, where a party has been dispossessed from the suit property by appointing a receiver or otherwise; in such a case, the court should, while holding that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, must put back the party in the position he was on the date of suit. But this power or obligation has nothing to do with the proposition that while in force, these orders have to be obeyed and their violation can be punished even after the question of jurisdiction is decided against the plaintiff provided the violation is committed before the decision of the court on the question of Jurisdiction.
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